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ABSTRACT: Margot Walström, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on
Sexual Violence defines sexual violence as a "way of demonstrating power and control. It
inflicts fear on the whole community. And it is unfortunately a very effective, cheap and
silent weapon with a long-lasting effect on every society.” Despite the universal damage
of sexual violence throughout history, international law did not begin to develop a response
to such crimes until the 1990s. Worldwide fear and shame associated with atrocities of
sexual violence, difficulty defining it across cultures, challenges to accurate data collection,
and lack of collective action all contribute to the international community’s silence. This
paper analyzes how sexual violence has been defined in international law through its
integration into the international justice system: first, as torture by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and second, as genocide by the International
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, and third, how the Rome Statute criminalized sexual
violence in its establishment of the International Criminal Court. Additionally, this paper
discusses how sex trafficking has been acknowledged by international law, primarily
through the United Nations’ development of soft law. Finally, this essay examines how
United Nations peacekeeping missions and other international institutions continually
undermine the international community’s efforts to tackle sexual violence and trafficking.
Introduction
Margot Walström, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual
Violence in Conflict, defines it best: "[Sexual violence] is a way of demonstrating power and
control. It inflicts fear on the whole community. And it is unfortunately a very effective, cheap and
silent weapon with a long-lasting effect on every society."1 Despite the universal damage of sexual
violence throughout history, international law did not begin to develop a response to such crimes
until the 1990s. Worldwide fear and shame associated with atrocities of sexual violence, difficulty
defining it across cultures, challenges to accurate data collection, and lack of collective action all
contribute to the international community’s silence. Nevertheless, state actors and international
organizations have taken steps to acknowledge sexual violence as a crime against humanity
through meticulous integration into case law of ad hoc tribunals, soft law, and foundations for
enforcement mechanisms. All the while, the number of victims from developing and developed
nations alike continues to rise.
This paper analyzes how sexual violence has been defined in international law through its
integration into the international justice system: first, as torture by the International Criminal
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Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and second, as genocide by the International Criminal
Tribunals for Rwanda, and third, how the Rome Statute criminalized sexual violence in its
establishment of the International Criminal Court. Additionally, this paper discusses how sex
trafficking has been acknowledged by international law, primarily through the United Nations’
development of soft law. Finally, this essay examines how United Nations peacekeeping missions
and other international institutions continually undermine the international community’s efforts to
tackle sexual violence and trafficking.
International law generally refers to the public law which governs relations between
independent states, the operations of international institutions, and how states treat individuals,
corporations, or other private entities. Although international law recognizes states as sovereign
actors, international institutions and international tribunals can create “binding” law, although
individual states accept a large portion of international law as self-enforcing norms. These norms
shift over time if the majority of states change their views on a certain issue. For example, over
the course of several centuries, states shifted from accepting slavery to considering it a serious
violation of international law. The primary source of enforcement for international law comes from
the pressure independent states place on one another to maintain international stability. Although
states often break international law, states recognize the benefits they receive from a coherent
international system. The international institutions that make up this system provide global
solutions by creating a common standard, minimizing the incentive to free riding, providing
international cooperation, and establishing enforcement mechanisms. For this reason, states accept
enforcement from bodies such as the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court
because these institutions provide a source of the international cooperation and stability
independent states otherwise cannot accomplish.
Due to a long cumulation of feminist pressure, in 2000, the UN Security Council adopted
the landmark Resolution 1325, formally recognizing gender-based violence, especially sexual
violence, in the context of war.2 A later resolution adopted in 2008, UNSC Resolution 1820, went
even further to clarify “rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime
against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide.” 3 which made the additional
request of the Security General, “to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all
peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations.” This transition shows
clear progress in the acknowledgement of sexual violence as a war crime and efforts by the UN to
self-regulate its own perpetration of such crimes; nevertheless, the war against sexual violence and
trafficking is far from won. The recognition of these crimes, while substantial, does not translate
easily into enforceable mechanisms, so countless victims have yet to reap the benefits of the
progress the international community has made.
Defining Sexual Violence in International Law
Victims and their advocates have demanded increased attention to sexual violence as a war
crime for the last three decades, yet the international community has been traditionally apathetic
to these crimes. The international community responded with silence to crimes of a sexual nature
before the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.4 Furthermore, the creation of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols
gave little consideration to these crimes. 5 The case law of these tribunals and subsequent ad hoc
tribunals of a similar nature continue to establish the characterization of sexual violence as a
legitimate human rights violation. The primary influence of these tribunals in relation to sexual
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violence has been through a process of establishing precedent which results in treaty-making,
affecting later decisions.
Although this process has been a relatively slow one, in general, the few norms, that are
accepted by the international community and that have graduated to the status of jus cogens,
become legally binding and enforceable under international law. For example, the decisions of the
ICTY and ICTR resulted in provisions to the Rome Statute and decisions made in the Special
Court for Sierra Leone. 6 This accumulation of international prosecution establishes a “norms
cascade” which builds the foundation for the illegality of rape and sex trafficking. 7 Crimes of jus
cogens status don’t require ratification of a treaty, but rather crimes can be prosecuted by any state
on the basis of universal jurisdiction. 8 With the codification of the Rome Statute in 1998, the
international community groundbreakingly criminalized the acts of sex trafficking, sexual
violence, and forced pregnancy clearly advancing this “norms cascade.” 9 With continued attention
and acceptance of sexual violence as an international crime, these crimes receive the same status
as violations such as genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery and torture.
Rape Prosecuted as Torture
Historically not recognized as a war crime, opposing sides often viewed sexual violence a
as simply a misfortunate consequence of war. Therefore, to achieve recognition in international
law, sexual violence was first attached to pre-established international crimes. As of now, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, as well as the International Criminal Court have successfully integrated sexual violence
into the definition of war crimes, officially establishing jus cogens status.10 Yet, the first
acknowledgment of sexual violence by the ICTY had to be made by characterizing it as a
mechanism of torture. The Tribunal relied primarily on the UN Torture Convention and its
definition:
The 1984 UN Torture Convention defines torture as any act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.11
The ICTY emphasized the importance of specifying what qualified as torture and
the definition was revised to include the following:
(i) This act or omission must be intentional; (ii) It must aim at obtaining information
or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a third
person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person; (iii) It
must be linked to an armed conflict; and (iv) At least one of the persons involved must be
a public official or must at any rate act in non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of
a State or any other authority-wielding entity.12
This revision clarifies the act of torture as first, intentional and second, linked to the will of a public
official or perpetrated on account of non-private persons. This clarification allows the crime to
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supersede domestic jurisdiction and be viewed as an international crime committed by or in
association with a state, thus providing ICTY jurisdiction. At that time, the Tribunal realized the
prosecution of rape as torture had far more basis in international law, thus it expanded the
definition of torture to include rape rather than prosecute it independently.
The ICTY notably considered rape as torture during the Čelebići Trial Judgment.13 In the
prosecution of one of the deputy commanders of the Čelebići prison camp, Delalic was charged
under Articles 2(b) and 3.14 The Trial Chamber found that Delalic raped his victim in an effort to
intimidate her into revealing information about her husband, to punish her on account of her
husband's actions, and to instill fear and helplessness.15 In this case, the ICTY relied specifically
on the 1992 Report by the Special Rapporteur on Torture presented to the Commission on Human
Rights where the Trial Chamber described “the rape of any person to be a despicable act which
strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity.” 16 With these conclusions the Trial
Chamber finally attested to the serious repercussions of rape and sexual violence, solidifying its
validity in the international law. Additionally, the Tribunal referred to the case law of its
counterpart in Rwanda and its Akayesu decision discussed further later on. 17 The prosecution of
this particular rape as torture, relied on proof that the defendant’s sexual violence against the victim
was fully motivated by “obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating,
humiliating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against
the victim or a third person.”18 In addition, the Tribunal found in under the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slaverylike Practices during Armed Conflict, “the discrimination prong of the definition of torture in the
Torture Convention provides an additional basis for prosecuting rape and sexual violence as
torture.”19 Further, the “violence inflicted upon her (namely rape) was due to the fact that she was
a woman;” this form of discrimination comprises a prohibited purpose for the offense of torture.20
Thus, the Trial Chamber accounts for Delalic’s rape as torture by intimidation, punishment, and
discrimination among other reasons. At the time of the case, no official “checklist” for offenses of
rape existed, so the ICTY relied on the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture to establish what acts
might qualify.21 In this way, the Court constructed its own basis to judge the prosecution of rape
as torture by “special procedures,” provided by the UN Torture Statute, the UN Special Rapporteur
on Torture, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape,
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict, and other case precedent.
Rape Prosecuted as Genocide
More recently international criminal law has also prosecuted rape as genocide under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The international
community took note of ICTR’s unique approach to incorporating international human rights
provisions in criminal trials, especially in the Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu case.22 This case
represented the first conviction of sexual violence in the history of international law as a crime
against humanity or genocide. 23Although the original indictments did not include rape charges,
prosecutors amended the complaint due to criticism from the New York-based International
Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic; the Center for Constitutional Rights; and Navanethem Pillay,
a female judge from South Africa; among other activists. 24 Witness accounts of horrific
widespread sexual violence, including rape with foreign objects, gang rape, forced miscarriage,
and forced prostitution strongly backed these efforts.25
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Lacking previous relevant provisions, the ICTR relied primarily on the UN Genocide
Convention of 1948 and its travaux préparatoires. Enumerated in Article 2 of the Statute, the
Tribunal decided that the actus reus of the crime comprised offenses relevant to this case. 26
According the 1948 Genocide Convention, Article II, genocide is:
…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 27
“The mens rea of the crime, which makes the crime especially difficult to prove, is a
specific intent to ‘wholly or partly destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.’” 28
Consequently, similar to the ICTY in the Čelebići case, the proof of intent presents a roadblock
for the prosecution in Rwanda. 29
After the application of genocide to the case, the Court focused on defining sexual violence
within genocidal activtity specifically in regard to the Akayesu case.30
The ICTR found that acts of sexual violence constitute genocide:
in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such…Sexual
violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting
Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction
of the Tutsi group as a whole...This sexualized representation of ethnic identity
graphically illustrates that Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because
they were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the
Tutsi group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself. 31
The court emphasizes the destructive nature of this sexual violence against Tutsi women
as being the pure motive of the sexual violence perpetrated and therefore within the definition of
genocide as “a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part.”32 Marochkin notes that when the
ICTR decided what constitutes “serious bodily harm,” the emphasized acts of sexual violence and
rape fully qualified.33 This officially included rape and sexual violence afflicted against Tutsi
women by Akayesu on account of the intent behind the systematic rape, the constitution of rape as
“serious bodily harm,” and the rape’s “destructive” nature.
In Prosecutor v. Musema, the Chamber discussed offenses of sexual violence that
prevented births of a victimized group. 34 For example, sexual mutilation, forced sterilization,
forced birth control, forced separation of males and females, and prohibition of marriages, all
sought to limit new births of the victims’ ethnicity and therefore fell within the crime of genocide.
The Court clarified that in a patriarchal Rwandan society, the identity of the father determines
group membership.35 An example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the
case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another
group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its
mother's group.” 36 Hence, in the case of the atrocities committed against the Tutsis,’ Hutu rapists,
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such as Musema or Akayesu, could be motivated by the fact that consequential births would result
in more children identified as Hutu, at least within the context of Rwanda culture.
Thus, both Tribunals creatively addressed issues of sexual violence and rape by
categorizing these offenses under the more explicit and widely recognized crimes that were easily
as prosecuted war crimes of torture and genocide. Both the ICTY and the ICTR found themselves
incredibly limited by outdated, abstract, or nonexistent sources of international law. After
interpreting the limited number of relevant Statutes, the Tribunals referred to a range of preexisting soft law, such as treaties on human rights, conclusions from previous human rights cases,
and other human rights bodies. From which, the Tribunals creatively filled the gaps in the present
international law to adequately address rape as a distinguishable and punishable international
crime.
While the Rome Statute adopts similar language of sexual violence and trafficking from
both the ITCY and ICTR Statutes, its efforts to criminalize gender-based violence supersedes its
predecessors.37 The original purpose behind the creation of the ICC was to simply codify existing
international law, but nearly exclusive male participation in the establishment of international law
up to that point resulted in a lack of adequate attention to women’s issues.38 Due to pressure from
international feminist non-profit organizations, female-friendly language was added to the draft of
the Rome Statute to include specific forms of gender-based violence, prosecutive and investigative
mechanisms, and fair representation of women within ICC staff. 39 This pressure resulted in the
specific recognition of gender-based violence as crime against humanity in Article 7 and as war
crimes under Article 8. 40 The Rome Statute listed rape as both a crime against humanity and a war
crime, allowing the prosecution more flexibility. 41 A war crime is easier to prove than a crime
against humanity, my considering the prosecution only need to prove the rape was part of a “plan
or policy,” rather than a “widespread or systematic attack.” 42 Unfortunately, while the inclusion of
these articles is monumental, the ICC has had limited success in the investigation and prosecution
of these crimes.43 The ICC’s first conviction of sexual slavery incredibly did not occur until July
2019.44 As the Court’s fourth conviction overall, Ntaganda was unanimously sentenced to 30 years
in prison.45
Defining Sex Trafficking in International Law
Modern slavery works similarly to other forms of trafficking of drugs or arms, except these
traffickers transport individuals. Such individuals, in search of better opportunities especially when
they hope to cross into better developed countries such as the United States, may be ensnared by
trafficking institutions.46 Involuntary trafficking on the other hand, entails the abduction of
individuals transported to a foreign country and forced into various forms of servitude including
sex work.47 The overlap between issues of migration, modern slavery, and smuggling consequently
complicate both the identifying and criminalizing of sex trafficking on the whole. 48 Although
apparent discrepancies exist in how different governments, academics, and activists characterize
sex trafficking, both voluntary and involuntary modes entail transportation of individuals across
borders for the purpose of exploiting their labor and therefore, encompass trafficking.
Although sex trafficking was widely recognized as an issue well before the 21st century,
the lack of a formal definition hindered any effort of the international community to combat it.
This definition was finally established in 2000 with the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) in Article 3,
Section (a):
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(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs;”49
Later reinforced in Article 6, the Protocol obligates states to criminalize trafficking as
defined.50
The Palermo Protocol represented the first contemporary initiative to combat sex
trafficking at the international level. 51 Of the 192 states of the UN, 172 have signed and ratified
the Protocol, none of which included reservations specifically regarding the definition provided in
Article 3.52 Article 5 obligates states to "adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in Article 3 of this Protocol.” 53
Yet despite this mandatory measure, states failed to criminalize sex trafficking by defining it to a
limited scope of conduct. 54 For example, the US State Department’s narrow definition exemplifies
this failure, decisively ignoring extra-legal migration.55 In this way, although many states were
quick to adopt the Protocol into domestic law, the resulting domestic law applied to more limited
circumstances than what the international law had originally called for. States additionally lacked
the readiness to actually enforce even the inadequate law they adopted. 56
This absence of a clear definition in domestic criminal law exists in multiple states, despite
their being obligated to incorporate such under Article 5. 57 For this reason, the United Nations has
installed several mechanisms: under the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention and its
Protocols, the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Convention on Transnational
Organized Crime (Conference of the Parties) to monitor states’ compliance. 58 In 2006, the
Conference of Parties underwent a survey of definitions provided by obligated states. 59 The survey
asked how states defined trafficking in persons in their domestic law in accordance with Article
3.60 Many states’ responses claimed to be in full compliance with the definition provided in Article
3 and obligations in Article 5, but basic analysis of their domestic laws’ definition of human
trafficking showed clear noncompliance. 61 Nonetheless, some states, such as Turkey, copied the
definition of human trafficking from Article 3 verbatim into their own domestic law, but these
states are in the minority. 62 According to Dempsey, Hoyle, and Bosworth, gaps could be due to a
state’s lack of technical expertise in drafting effective criminal codes, the absence of a competent
international enforcement mechanism, pressure from economic crisis, or possibly, the inherent
vagueness of the Article 3 definition. 63 Whatever cause creates gaps in the states’ definitions, other
actors can interfere, effectively making change more likely. In this case, as the authoritative
regulatory party, the Conference of Parties has the responsibility for holding noncompliant states
accountable.64 If the Conference of Parties drew enough attention to states’ neglect of human
trafficking, states would eventually adapt in order to protect their reputations. 65
Aside from narrowing the definition of human trafficking, states hesitate to collect data on
sex trafficking within their territories. 66 Due to the intimate and traumatic nature of the crime, sex
trafficking, already extremely underreported, results in often inaccurate data. Due to public
appearances, states want to keep hidden even those underreported numbers. 67 Still aside from
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acknowledgement of United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Protocols Thereto, the US made additional efforts to regulate foreign states’ efforts to combat
human trafficking.68 The US Trafficking Victims Protection Act mandated that the US State
Department report efforts of foreign states to regulate trafficking. 69 This mandate has influence
over states who rely on US foreign aid, and for this reason, has proven in some ways more effective
than international law established by the UN.70 Although representing significant progress in
providing accountability, the US TVPA encourages dependent states to underreport the severity
of trafficking within their borders to preserve humanitarian and military aid from the US. 71
Ironically, the US did not evaluate its own practices until a decade after the US TVPA was
passed.72 When it did finally perform self-evaluation, the US concluded itself a leading crusader
against human trafficking on the world stage. 73 This contradiction presents a conflict of interest:
how can the international community avoid global super powers, such as the US, from acting as
an international police force and producing biased promotions of their own efforts? This conflict
only further shows the politicized nature of human trafficking reporting and the ensuing possibility
of corruption. Therefore, while both international law and domestic law have made notable efforts
to respond to human trafficking, both ultimately fall short of collecting dependable data and
painting a representative portrait of illegal trafficking practices abroad. Thus, despite the clear
establishment of laws against trafficking, these laws largely lack enforcement priorities.
Subsequently, the lack of protection and assistance of victims of trafficking weakens
international law.74 In the rare instances of successful prosecution, human traffickers are usually
prosecuted under immigration violations, not under human rights abuse, resulting in little to no
acknowledgement of victims. 75 Because hard international law encroaches on state sovereignty,
the international sphere has primarily implemented soft law to aid victims. 76 For example, the
Palermo Protocol and other efforts by the UN largely support this prosecution-focused approach,
but use vague language regarding assistance and pathways for justice of victims.77 In addition, in
2002, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights adopted the Recommended Principles and
Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking.78 Although soft law, the Recommended
Principles and Guidelines deter policies that unfairly prosecute trafficking victims as illegal
migrants.79 Even if successful, scholars and policy makers understand that focusing on punishment
would not effectively deter sex trafficking, thus activists favor a more proactive human rights
approach centered on protecting victims.80
Activists in the drafting of the Rome Statute played a key role in establishing protection
for witnesses and victims of sexual violence and trafficking, primarily in Article 65. 81 The first
case in the ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, should have been easily won.82 Unfortunately, the
prosecution was forced to drop rape charges against Tadic because the last witness refused to
testify under threats to herself and family. 83 Lehr-Lehnardt argues that this case likely influenced
the drafters of the Rome Statute to include witness anonymity and protection until a witness
protection plan can be enacted. 84 The Rome Statute also created a Victims and Witnesses Unit
specifically tasked to provide protection, counseling for trauma caused by sexual violence, and
other necessary assistance. 85 In summary, the Rome Statute takes progressive steps to recognize
the needs of witnesses and victims in the ICC that previously caused prosecution failure in the
ICTY. Furthermore, the Rome Statute took specific caution to identify the trafficking of women
and children as a crime against humanity and therefore highly prosecutable in the ICC. 86
Development of International Law with Regard to Peacekeeping Operations
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Although the international community has made a notable effort to address sex trafficking
through the development of law, its institutions simultaneously escalate human trafficking issues
as exemplified by UN peacekeeping missions. For the past three decades, victims continually bring
allegations against peacekeepers for sexual misconduct against the people they were sent to
protect. Dating back to the early 1990s, the first accusations to gain international attention
originated from Cambodia and Somalia, shortly followed by similar allegations in Sierra Leone in
2003 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004. Many more allegations of sexual abuse
of humanitarian aid workers have surfaced since the early 2000s. This year sex scandals erupted
in the Democratic Republic of Congo where humanitarian workers were sent in response to the
Ebola crisis and in Uganda where aid workers respond to food shortages due to extreme drought
throughout the region. Aside from allegations brought specifically against UN peacekeepers, in
general, peacekeeping missions have been instrumental in reinforcing local trafficking systems.
Shortly after the Cold War, the United Nations took on more ambitious peacekeeping missions,
enlisting forces of less experienced and less capable states; ergo, questions arose of mission
effectiveness and, all too often, the conduct of the peacekeepers involved. 87 Peacekeeping mission
units are assembled from a wide range of cultures and ideologies. This reality alone makes
managing and communicating accurately within units challenging but preventing misconduct even
more difficult.
Therefore, as state governments and UN bureaucrats fight for the legitimacy of global antitrafficking policy, such as the Palermo Protocol, corrupt UN peacekeepers in crisis zones around
the globe undermine their efforts. 88 The first specific effort made by the UN to recognize the
misconduct of peacekeepers didn’t occur until 2005 with the release of the Zeid Report. 89 The
report found that in the DRC “typical forms of sexual exploitation and abuse...included the
exchange of sex for money, food, or jobs; what some young girls interviewed by the commission
described as ‘rape disguised as prostitution.’” 90 Similar reports “from missions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor‐Leste in the 1990s and in West Africa in the early
2000s, and called for uniform, binding standards of conduct for peacekeepers.” 91
Trafficking crime thrives within well-developed states, such as the US, despite genuine
preventative measures taken to stamp out its existence. In less-developed states, human trafficking
has substantially fewer hoops to jump through, already embedded into local communities in crisis
well before the arrival of peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the mere presence of a large
number of male peacekeepers further drives the local sex industry. 92 Unchecked, operations
heighten demand for women, resulting in the increased establishment of brothels, strip clubs, and
bars.93 Furthermore, through their inherent authority, peacekeepers contribute to systematic
“transactional sex,” trading much-needed resources for sex with locals. 94 Since peacekeeping
missions were first introduced in 1957, demand for humanitarian intervention has increased,
leading to less vetting. When forces became increasingly diversified, accountability decreased,
driving up illegal activity.
Slowed by collective action problems, the development of international law in response to
these atrocities has rendered little progress in the realistic prevention of misconduct by UN
peacekeepers. With the Zeid Report in 2005, the UN made an official effort to combat the sexual
misconduct of peacekeepers. 95 Prior to the release of the Zeid Report, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations acknowledged there was strong evidence of peacekeeper missions
involvement in trafficking, with the release of a policy paper in 2004. 96 This paper, “Human
Trafficking and United Nations Peacekeeping,” outlined two main objectives: (a) in support of
the Secretary General’s “zero-tolerance” policy proposal, the UN will establish a system by which
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peacekeeping forces will be monitored, investigated, and punished on account of involvement in
trafficking practices, and (b) upon request, have the mechanisms capable of supporting national
efforts made by international member states in curbing human trafficking, especially within postconflict states.97 Since this proposal, limited advances have been made in terms of enacting these
proposals, but the UN successfully created the Conduct and Discipline Unit within the Department
of Peace Operations in 2005 and the deployment of Conduct and Discipline Teams to DPKO’s
beginning in 2007.98 Such measures secured the UN’s responsibility to conduct training, spread
awareness, and collect allegations of misconduct. 99 Additionally, other operations, such as the UN
Office of Internal Oversight Services, have offices in a few of the most abuse‐prone PKO host
countries, which facilitate investigations into peacekeeping operations independent of the
DPKO.100 Yet, these regulatory mechanisms lack effectiveness without the additional action to vet
peacekeepers.101 The source of peacekeepers’ misconduct is their functional immunity, which
protects individuals when currently engaging in mission efforts.102 The Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU), an agreement between a troop-contributing country (TCC) and the UN,
essentially dictates only TCCs have the power to prosecute military members of its nationality for
crimes committed in the context of a peacekeeping mission (usually internally, within the TCC’s
military justice system). These peacekeepers are never subject to the host state’s jurisdiction, but
rather the military justice systems of the TCC, even for serious allegations. 103 Automatically,
peacekeepers' cases fall within the jurisdiction of the domestic court from which they originate.
On the other hand, the UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (2016) gives the Secretary-General
the power to repatriate military and form police units “when there is credible evidence of
widespread or systematic sexual exploitation and abuse by that unit,” and “requests the SecretaryGeneral to repatriate all military or formed police units of TCCs that systematically fail their
accountability obligations, from the country where the allegations have arisen.” 104 Jennings
clarifies that immunity is not waived in these cases, but even if the Secretary-General exercises
authority to repatriate units, the peacekeepers involved are still only subject to the authority of
their home country, not the host country. 105
While the Rome Statute takes a clear stance on trafficking and sexual violence by an
perpetrator, due to its “complementary” jurisdiction, the ICC faces similar blocks to the UN.106 In
order for ICC jurisdiction to apply, a peacekeeper must first commit an international war crime,
genocide, or crime against humanity. 107 Second, the TCC must be determined “unwilling” to
adequately investigate and prosecute this crime in a “meaningful manner and without good
reason.”108 Ultimately, the ICC was created to prosecute those guilty of “the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole.”109 Arguably, the ICC should be reserved
for large scale international crime of which the transgressions of peacekeepers would not usually
qualify, except in extreme cases.110 Thus, the ICC may not represent the path to prosecution of
these crimes. Since the states in which these crimes occur usually have ineffective or polluted
justice systems, prosecution becomes the responsibility of the domestic courts of criminal
peacekeepers.
As a preventative measure, the counterintuitive activities available to peacekeepers where
they are stationed could be replaced by extracurriculars that are beneficial to community
development.111 The UN outlined multiple crime prevention strategies in crisis zones: the social
development approach which promotes prosocial behavior through social, economic, health and
educational measures; community-based prevention, which focuses on altering the conditions in
communities that encourage victimization; situational crime prevention aimed at reducing crime
opportunity; and reintegration and assistance programs.112 All of these indirectly reduce the sex
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trafficking systems built into the societies before the peacekeepers arrive. Cumulatively, these
mechanisms work to not only hold peacekeepers accountable, but prevent misconduct before it
occurs`.
Before any opposition from conflict-ridden states would be unheard of, but with a growing
transnational advocacy network, this opposition has a much louder voice. This voice continues to
draw attention to allegations against peacekeepers, especially when they detail the atrocities of
sexual violence and trafficking. This rising pressure undoubtedly forces the international
community to turn inward and deal with the sexual violence its institutions protect and promote.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper, one can observe that although ad hoc tribunals, such as the ICTY
and ICTR, have successfully integrated the prosecution of sexual violence as a war crime, the
international community refrained from establishing hard law on the issue of sexual violence and
sex trafficking. While the language of the Rome Statute has allowed the prosecution of sexual
violence and human trafficking a much clearer path to conviction, both of these crimes have
already been largely recognized under customary international law, resulting in little to no
implementation in the ICC.113 The established soft law can be easily manipulated by perpetrators,
such as UN peacekeepers who commit sexual misconduct in crisis zones. Although genuine efforts
have been made by policymakers to combat sexual violence and sex trafficking, the lack of hard
law and adequate enforcement mechanisms limit real change both externally across the globe and
internally by their own peacekeeping operations and humanitarian personnel.
Reports made by the UN Secretary General on women, peace, and security, first started in
2002, upon request of the UNSC resolution 1325.114 This resolution marked a formal recognition
by the UNSC to assess the impact of war conflict on gender-based violence, especially in regard
to sexual violence.115 In 2002, the Secretary General reported that in times of war, “women and
girls are vulnerable to all forms of violence, in particular sexual violence and exploitation,
including torture, rape, mass rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and
trafficking.”116 Since 2002, the Secretary General has published 34 reports, establishing a steady
increase in measures taken by the UN to combat sexual violence. 117 The report from November
24, 2010, showed progress implemented over a 2-year span through Resolutions 1820 and 1888
with “measures to improve the collection of information and recommendations aimed at enhanced
response.”118 In the latest report, issued June 3, the Secretary General recognizes the year of 2020
as a pivotal moment in the fight against sexual violence, marking the 25th anniversary of the
adoption of the resolution 1325.119
As summarized by the Secretary General:
Despite important progress on the policy and operational fronts, we face an
increasingly complex global security environment in which sexual violence
remains a cruel tactic of war, torture, terror and political repression, and a brutally
effective tool of displacement and dehumanization. We have yet to adequately
invest in tackling the structural root causes that drive and perpetuate this violence,
including gender inequality, which is exacerbated by conflict and militarization.
Survivor-centred, rights-based response aims to create a safe and participatory
environment, including through contextualized solutions that build resilience and
address the diverse experiences of all survivors.This approach is critical to ensuring
that no one is left behind or excluded from the dividends of peace and
development.120
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This statement indicates both the difficult path ahead, and the adoption of a new approach:
the proactive, victims-centered method advocated by Dinan and other activists. 121 This paper gives
an account of the development of policy in regard to sexual violence and the failure of the
international community to adequately report and prosecute such crimes. Yet, as the Secretary
General notes, to adequately solve the issue of sexual violence and sex trafficking, the international
community must attack the root from which these crimes stem, gender inequality. This inequality
has orchestrated every transgression taken against women on account of their gender and continues
to influence even the most well-developed nations where women continue to fight for their rights.
In reality, international law developed in regard to sexual violence cannot function fully until
gender inequality is truly eradicated, a development that could take centuries. In the meantime, the
international community can take advantage of its influence, prosecuting the few cases of sexual
violence within its jurisdiction, and establishing enforcement mechanisms which effectively apply
pressure to the entrenched systems of rape and sex trafficking.
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